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Abstract:	The	vast	majority	of	work	on	 the	ethics	of	war	 focuses	on	 traditional	wars	between	states.	In	this	chapter,	I	aim	to	show	that	this	is	an	oversight	worth	rectifying.	 My	 strategy	 will	 be	 largely	 comparative,	 assessing	 whether	 certain	claims	often	defended	in	discussions	of	interstate	wars	stand	up	in	the	context	of	civil	 conflicts,	 and	whether	 there	are	principled	moral	differences	between	 the	two	types	of	case.	Firstly,	I	argue	that	thinking	about	intrastate	wars	can	help	us	make	 progress	 on	 important	 theoretical	 debates	 in	 recent	 just	 war	 theory.	Secondly,	 I	 consider	whether	 certain	 kinds	 of	 civil	wars	 are	 subject	 to	 a	more	demanding	 standard	 of	 just	 cause,	 compared	 to	 interstate	 wars	 of	 national-defence.	 Finally,	 I	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 having	 popular	 support	 is	 an	independent	 requirement	 of	 permissible	 war,	 and	 whether	 this	 renders	insurgencies	harder	to	justify	than	wars	fought	by	functioning	states.		Keywords:	Civil	War;	Revolution;	Insurgencies;	Cecile	Fabre;	Consent	
	
1.	Introduction	It	 is	 often	 claimed	 that	 war	 just	 isn’t	 like	 it	 used	 to	 be.2	Most	 strikingly,	 the	majority	of	armed	conflicts	now	occur	within	 the	borders	of	states,	rather	 than	
across	international	borders	(or	combine	the	two).	According	to	one	study,	of	the	118	 armed	 conflicts	 that	 have	 occurred	 between	 1989	 and	 2004,	 only	 7	were	interstate	wars.3	More	anecdotally,	at	the	time	of	writing	a	horrific	civil	war	has	raged	 in	Syria	 for	over	 three	years,	Ukraine	 teeters	on	 the	brink	of	descending	into	internecine	conflict,	and	the	fledgling	Iraqi	state	is	facing	violent	opposition	from	powerful	sub-state	actors.	In	short,	intrastate	conflict	is	now	very	much	the	norm	rather	than	the	exception.	Interestingly,	 given	 these	 facts,	 there	 have	 been	 remarkably	 few	 sustained	treatments	of	civil	war	within	 the	recent	resurgence	 in	 interest	 in	 the	ethics	of	
																																																								1	Thanks	to	Cecile	Fabre,	Henry	Shue,	Cheyney	Ryan,	Janina	Dill,	Michael	Gibb,	and	Bernard	Koch	for	stimulating	discussion	of	a	very	early	draft,	and	to	Seth	Lazar	and	Helen	Frowe	for	detailed	and	extremely	helpful	comments.		2	For	an	 influential	 example,	 see	Mary	Kaldor,	New	and	Old	Wars:	Organised	Violence	in	a	Global	
Era,	2nd	Edition,	(Cambridge:		Polity	Press,	2007	3	Lotta	Harbom	and	Peter	Wallensteen,	‘Armed	Conflict	and	its	International	Dimensions’,	Journal	
of	Peace	Research	42,	No.5	(2005),	623-635.	
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war.	4	Most	discussions	remained	focused	on	traditional	wars	between	states.5	In	this	chapter,	I	aim	to	show	that	this	is	an	oversight	worth	rectifying.	My	strategy	will	be	largely	comparative,	assessing	whether	certain	claims	often	defended	in	discussions	 of	 interstate	 wars	 stand	 up	 in	 the	 context	 of	 civil	 conflicts,	 and	whether	there	are	principled	moral	differences	between	the	two	types	of	case.	In	Section	2,	I	argue	that	thinking	about	intrastate	wars	can	help	us	make	progress	on	 an	 important	 theoretical	 debate	 in	 recent	 just	 war	 theory.	 In	 Section	 3,	 I	consider	whether	 certain	 kinds	 of	 civil	wars	 are	 subject	 to	 a	more	 demanding	standard	of	just	cause,	compared	to	interstate	wars	of	national-defence.	Finally,	in	 Section	 4,	 I	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 having	 popular	 support	 is	 an	independent	 requirement	 of	 permissible	 war,	 and	 whether	 this	 renders	insurgencies	harder	to	justify	than	wars	fought	by	functioning	states.	In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 frame	 for	 our	 inquiry,	 I	 will,	 following	 Cecile	 Fabre,	understand	civil	wars	 to	be	armed	conflicts	 that:	 are	 fought	between	sub-state	groups	 and	 their	 own	 government,	 or	 among	 non-state	 factions	 within	 a	community;	are	fought	over	political	goals;	involve	a	level	of	violence	that	passes	a	threshold	of	severity;	in	which	each	belligerent	party	has	the	ability	to	impose	significant	casualties	on	the	other.6	
	
2.	The	Theoretical	Significance	of	Non-Traditional	Conflicts	While	the	majority	of	my	discussion	will	concern	the	substantive	permissibility	of	 resorting	 to	 civil	war,	 I	 begin	 by	 discussing	 how	 the	 issue	 of	 intrastate	war	bears	 upon	 a	 central	 debate	 in	 contemporary	 just	 war	 theory	 at	 a	 more	theoretical	level.7			
2.1	Two	Approaches	to	the	Morality	of	War	A	key	fault	line	within	current	discussions	concerns	how	we	should	understand	the	relationship	between	the	moral	principles	that	govern	warfare	and	those	that	
																																																								4	As	William	V.	O’Brien	observed	over	 thirty	years	ago,	 “Logically,	 there	should	be	an	elaborate	
jus	ad	bellum	and	jus	in	bello	for	revolutionary	war,	but	development	of	such	a	doctrine	has	never	been	 seriously	 attempted.”	William	V.	O’Brien,	The	Conduct	of	Just	and	Limited	War	(New	York:	Praeger,	1981),	p.23.		5	Though	 the	 tide	 does	 seem	 to	 be	 turning.	 See,	 Ned	 Dobos,	 Insurrection	and	Intervention:	The	
Two	 Faces	 of	 Sovereignty	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2012);	 Cecile	 Fabre,	
Cosmopolitan	War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	Ch.4;	Christopher	Finlay,	‘Legitimacy	and	Non-State	Political	Violence’,	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	18,	No.3	(2010),	287-312;	Allen	Buchanan,	 ‘The	 Ethics	 of	 Revolution	 and	 Its	 Implications	 for	 the	 Ethics	 of	 Intervention’,	
Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	 41,	 No.4	 (2013),	 292-323;	 Mattias	 Iser,	 'Beyond	 the	 Paradigm	 of	Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence',	in	Saba	Bazargan	and	Sam	Rickless	(eds),	The	Ethics	of	
War	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	 forthcoming).	 In	addition,	 two	monographs	on	this	 topic	are	 forthcoming:	 Christopher	 Finlay,	 Terrorism	 and	 the	 Right	 to	 Resist:	 A	 Theory	 of	 Just	
Revolutionary	 War	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press);	 Michael	 Gross,	 The	 Ethics	 of	
Insurgency:	A	Critical	Guide	to	Just	Guerrilla	Warfare	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press).	6	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.135.	7	The	 following	 section	 draws	 on	 Jonathan	 Parry,	 ‘Just	War	 Theory,	 Legitimate	 Authority,	 and	Irregular	Belligerency’,	Philosophia	(forthcoming).	
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apply	to	‘ordinary’	acts	of	violence	carried	out	in	non-military	contexts.	Positions	on	this	question	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	camps.		A	 reductivist	 approach	 treats	 warfare	 as	morally	 continuous	with	 all	 other	activities,	its	permissibility	determined	solely	by	familiar	justifications	for	killing	and	injuring	that	we	accept	in	all	other	circumstances.	8	On	this	view,	for	any	act	of	 justified	 killing	 in	 war,	 there	 are	 justified	 killings	 outside	 of	 war	 that	 are	justified	 on	precisely	 the	 same	 grounds.	 In	 terms	of	 identifying	 these	 grounds,	reductivists	standardly	hold	that	 intentional	killing	 in	war	 is	primarily	 justified	in	 terms	of	 individuals’	 rights	 of	 self-	 and	other-defence,	with	 collateral	 killing	justified	by	considerations	of	lesser-evil.	Justified	war	is	simply	an	aggregation	of	violent	acts,	each	of	which	is	justified	in	one	of	these	two	ways.		In	 opposition,	 exceptionalist	 approaches	 deny	 that	 the	 morality	 of	 war	 is	exhausted	by	ordinary	interpersonal	morality.	In	conditions	of	war,	the	standard	moral	 principles	 governing	 harming	 are	 either	 replaced	 or	 (more	 plausibly)	supplemented	by	additional	moral	considerations.	On	this	view,	for	at	least	some	acts	of	 justified	killing	 in	war,	 there	are	no	 justified	killings	outside	of	war	that	are	 justified	on	the	same	grounds.	An	exceptionalist	view	is	often	motivated	by	arguing	that	there	are	classes	of	killing	in	war	that	are	intuitively	permissible	or	impermissible,	but	which	cannot	be	justified	or	prohibited	solely	by	appealing	to	individuals’	 defensive	 rights	 or	 to	 standard	 lesser-evil	 justifications.9	If	 these	judgements	are	to	be	vindicated,	we	must	identify	additional	moral	properties	in	war	 capable	 of	 generating	 additional	 permissions	 to	 kill,	 or	 restrictions	 on	killing,	 beyond	 those	 identified	 by	 reductivists.	 What	 differentiates	exceptionalists	is	the	particular	properties	that	they	identify	as	playing	this	role.	Here	I	outline	four	prominent	versions,	which	need	not	be	exclusive.10		
2.2	Varieties	of	Exceptionalism	One	 important	 strand	 of	 exceptionalism	 locates	 the	 relevant	 properties	 in	features	 of	 the	 belligerent	 groups	 participating	 in	 an	 armed	 conflict.	 On	 a	
collectivist	version	of	this	view,	reductivism	is	incomplete	because	it	ignores	the	fact	that	war	is	something	that	individuals	do	together	as	co-members	in	morally	important	 kinds	 of	 association.	 More	 specifically,	 the	 claim	 is	 that	 the	relationships	 between	 co-members	 in	 certain	 kinds	 of	 group	 are	 capable	 of	altering	 the	moral	 status	 of	 acts	 of	 violence	 carried	 out	 by	members.11	On	 one	interpretation	 of	 this	 view,	 these	 relationships	 generate	 additional	 moral																																																									8	For	book	length	reductivist	treatments	of	war,	see	Jeff	McMahan,	Killing	in	War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009);	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War;	Helen	Frowe,	Defensive	Killing	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014).		9	For	both	sides	of	the	objection,	see	Seth	Lazar,	‘The	Responsibility	Dilemma	for	Killing	in	War:	A	Review	Essay’,	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	38,	No.2	(2010),	180-213.	10	For	a	more	detailed	discussion,	see	Seth	Lazar's	chapter	in	this	handbook.	11	See,	 for	 example,	 Christopher	 Kutz,	 ‘The	 Difference	 Uniforms	 Make:	 Collective	 Violence	 in	Criminal	Law	and	War’,	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	33,	No.2	(2005),	148-180;	George	Fletcher,	
Romantics	at	War:	Glory	and	Guilt	in	the	Age	of	Terrorism,	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2002).	
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reasons	 for	 or	 against	 killing	 in	 war,	 which	 defeat	 whatever	 reasons	 would	otherwise	 determine	 their	 permissibility.	 On	 another,	 the	 relevant	 deontic	alterations	 follow	 from	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 participants	 in	 collective	actions	bear	responsibility	for	their	actions,	compared	to	private	actors.		A	 different	 version	 of	 group-based	 exceptionalism	 focuses	 on	 the	 idea	 that	the	leaders	or	governing	institutions	of	certain	organisations	possess	legitimate	authority	 over	 their	members.	 	 This	 authority	 consists	 in	 the	moral	 power	 to	issue	commands	and,	by	doing	so,	place	the	subjects	of	 those	commands	under	obligations	to	act	as	directed.12	Authority-based	exceptionalism	holds	that,	under	certain	 conditions,	 individuals	 may	 be	 all-things-considered	 required	 to	 obey	commands	to	cause	(or	refrain	from	causing)	harm	in	war.	Importantly,	this	may	include	 cases	where	 harming	would	 be	 impermissible	 (or	 permissible)	 on	 the	basis	of	the	command-independent	reasons.13	Authoritative	commands	may	thus	provide	an	independent	source	of	permissions	and	constraints.	An	alternative	strand	of	exceptionalism	emphasises	the	fact	that	warfare	is	a	highly	 structured	 and	 convention-bound	practice.	 The	 central	 claim	 is	 that	 the	existence	 of	 conventional	 norms	 makes	 an	 important	 difference	 to	 the	 moral	permissibility	 of	 killing	 in	 war,	 compared	 to	 killing	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 these	conventions.	 This	 view	 is	most	 at	 home	within	 a	 broader	 contractualist	moral	theory,	 according	 to	 which	 the	moral	 status	 of	 (at	 least	 some)	 actions	 are	 (at	least	 partly)	 the	 product	 of	 agreement,	 either	 actual	 or	 idealised,	 among	 a	relevant	 class	 of	 contractors.	 For	 contractualist	 exceptionalists	 the	 moral	permissibility	 of	 certain	 actions	 in	 war	 is	 determined	 by	 whether	 a	 norm	permitting	 or	 prohibiting	 those	 actions	 would	 be	 accepted	 as	 binding	 by	belligerents.	For	example,	on	Yitzhak	Benbaji's	development	of	this	view,	a	class	of	killing	in	war	is	morally	permissible	if	it	is	sanctioned	by	a	convention	that	is	(i)	 mutually	 advantageous	 to	 opposing	 parties,	 (ii)	 fair,	 and	 (iii)	 accepted	 (at	least	tacitly)	by	participants.14	This	may	include	killings	that	would	be	prohibited	by	pre-contractual	moral	principles.		A	different	convention-based	view	does	not	ground	exceptional	norms	in	the	transformative	power	of	agreement,	but	instead	in	the	moral	importance	of	the	outcomes	 promoted	 by	 conventions	 containing	 those	 norms,	 such	 as	 reducing																																																									12	For	useful	 introductions,	see	 Joseph	Raz,	 ‘Introduction’	 in	 Joseph	Raz	(ed),	Authority	(Oxford:	Oxford	 University	 Press,	 1990),	 1-19;	 Scott	 Shapiro,	 ‘Authority’	 in	 Jules	 Coleman	 and	 Scott	Shapiro	 (eds),	 The	 Oxford	 Handbook	 of	 Jurisprudence	 and	 Philosophy	 of	 Law	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	382-439.	13	For	discussion,	see	David	Estlund	 ‘On	Following	Orders	 in	an	Unjust	War’,	 Journal	of	Political	
Philosophy	15,	 No.2	 (2007),	 213-234;	 Jonathan	 Parry	 'Authority	 and	 Harm'	 (unpublished	ms);	Massimo	Renzo,	 'Democratic	Authority	and	the	Duty	to	Fight	 in	Unjust	Wars',	Analysis	73,	No.4,	(2013),	 668-676;	 Massimo	 Renzo,	 ‘Duties	 of	 Citizenship	 and	 Just	 War’	 (unpublished	 ms);	Cheyney	Ryan,	 'Democratic	Duty	and	 the	Moral	Dilemmas	of	Soldiers',	Ethics	122,	No.1	 (2011),	10-42.	14	Yitzhak	Benbaji,	'The	Moral	Power	of	Soldiers	to	Undertake	the	Duty	of	Obedience',	Ethics	122,	no.	1	 (2011),	43-73;	 'The	War	Convention	and	 the	Moral	Division	of	Labour',	The	Philosophical	
Quarterly	59,	No.237	(2009),	593-617.	
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suffering	 in	 war.	 This	 view	 -	 which	 I	 term	 pragmatic	 humanitarian	exceptionalism	-	 is	typically	motivated	by	the	thought	that	norms	for	war	must	be	 implementable	 and	 action-guiding	 in	 real-world	 scenarios.	 Since	 (by	hypothesis)	combatants	will	be	unable	or	unwilling	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	moral	principles	identified	by	reductivists,	and	institutionalising	these	principles	in	law	would	be	counter-productive,	they	are	practically	irrelevant.	Instead,	war	ethicists	 should	 be	 concerned	 with	 identifying	 rules	 for	 war	 whose	implementation	 would	 do	 as	 much	 good	 as	 realistically	 possible,	 taking	 the	abilities	and	motivations	of	actual	participants	in	war	into	account.15		
	
2.3	The	Relevance	of	Non-Traditional	Conflicts	We	 can	 begin	 to	 appreciate	 how	 intrastate	 conflicts	 bear	 on	 the	reductivist/exceptionalist	debate	by	noting	a	key	difference	between	these	two	approaches.	 Whereas	 reductivism	 is	 universal	 in	 scope,	 evaluating	 all	 acts	 of	killing	 and	 injuring	 in	 terms	 of	 two	 invariant	 principles,	 exceptionalist	approaches	are	necessarily	scope-restricted.	On	these	views,	the	moral	status	of	(at	least	some)	acts	of	killing	depends	on	whether	those	acts	take	place	within	a	conflict	 that	 has	 the	 particular	 properties	 that	 exceptionalists	 identify	 as	generating	 additional	moral	 permissions	 and/or	 restrictions.	16	For	 example,	 it	may	depend	on	whether	the	conflict	it	is	fought	by	certain	kinds	of	collective	or	political	authority,	or	whether	it	falls	within	the	scope	of	a	binding	agreement	or	pragmatically	justified	convention.		With	this	in	mind,	the	key	feature	of	modern	conflict	I	want	to	emphasise	is	its	 sheer	 diversity.	 In	 particular,	 compared	 to	 the	 traditional	 Westphalian	paradigm	of	warfare	between	sovereign	states,	today's	conflicts	are	fought	by	a	wide	 range	 of	 'irregular'	 belligerents.	 This	 diversity	 poses	 three	 related	challenges	 for	 exceptionalist	 views,	 though	 the	 extent	 to	which	 each	 bites	will	depend	 on	 the	 particular	 form	 of	 exceptionalism	 under	 consideration.	 By	contrast,	none	of	these	challenges	arises	for	reductivism	given	its	universality.	The	first	holds	that	exceptionalism,	even	if	correct	 in	principle,	 fails	to	have	much	 practical	 significance,	 because	 the	 relevant	 exceptionalist	 properties	 are	far	 less	 likely	to	obtain	 in	 irregular	conflicts	than	in	traditional	 interstate	wars.	Given	the	infrequency	of	interstate	wars,	exceptionalist	approaches	will	not	offer	much	 guidance	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 real-life	 conflicts.	 This	 objection	 is	 perhaps	most	 clear	 in	 the	 case	 of	 contractualist	 exceptionalism,	 which	 almost	 always	takes	states	(or	perhaps	only	 'decent'	states17)	to	be	the	relevant	parties	to	the	agreement.	Hence,	in	conflicts	in	which	at	least	one	party	is	not	a	(decent)	state,	exceptional	 norms	 will	 not	 arise.	 But	 a	 similar	 point	 can	 be	 made,	 mutatis																																																									15	See,	for	example,	Henry	Shue,	‘Do	We	Need	a	‘Morality	of	War’?’	in	David	Rodin	and	Henry	Shue	(eds),	Just	and	Unjust	Warriors:	The	Moral	and	Legal	Status	of	Soldiers'	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	87-111.	16	Thanks	to	Seth	Lazar	for	helping	me	formulate	this	thought	more	clearly.	17	Benbaji,	'The	Moral	Power	of	Soldiers	to	Undertake	the	Duty	of	Obedience',	p.	45.	
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mutandis,	against	group-based	versions	of	exceptionalism.	Since	it	is	no	easy	task	to	 show	 that	 even	 functioning	 states	 possess	 the	 kind	 of	 collective	 agency	 or	political	authority	 required	 to	bring	exceptionalist	norms	 into	play,	we	may	be	sceptical	that	more	loosely	structured	sub-state	groups	will	be	able	to	do	so.		A	second	challenge	begins	by	noting	an	important	adequacy	requirement	for	exceptionalist	 approaches:	 If	 one	 holds	 that	 the	 permissibility	 of	 harming	depends	on	whether	it	takes	place	within	a	conflict	that	has	specific	properties,	then	 one	must	 be	 able	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	 boundary	 between	 the	 conflicts	 which	exhibit	 those	 properties	 and	 those	 which	 do	 not.	 Call	 this	 the	 demarcation	
requirement. 18 	Without	 demarcation,	 exceptionalism	 will	 assign	 an	indeterminate	moral	status	to	many	acts	of	harming	-	being	neither	permissible	nor	impermissible	-	which	is	a	serious	defect	in	any	normative	theory.	Given	this,	a	 potential	 challenge	 for	 exceptionalism	 (and	 group-based	 exceptionalism	 in	particular)	is	that	modern	wars	hugely	complicate	the	task	of	demarcation.	In	a	world	 in	which	 the	de	facto	ability	 to	 employ	 large-scale	 organised	 violence	 is	restricted	to	clearly	identifiable	state-actors,	demarcation	may	appear	relatively	straightforward.	 But	 this	 is	 not	 our	world.	 Instead,	 the	 empirical	messiness	 of	contemporary	 conflicts	 presents	 a	 spectrum	 of	 cases	 -	 ranging	 from	 regular	interstate	wars	 down	 to	mere	 large-scale	 banditry	 -	 that	 exhibit	 exceptionalist	properties	 to	 greater	 and	 lesser	 degrees.	 To	 satisfy	 the	 demarcation	requirement,	 exceptionalists	 must	 venture	 into	 the	 untidy	 range	 of	 cases	between	 these	 two	poles	and	provide	non-arbitrary	criteria	which	both	clearly	identify	the	relevant	thresholds	at	which	exceptionalist	norms	are	activated,	and	do	 so	without	 generating	 unintuitive	 results	 in	 particular	 cases	 (more	 on	 this	below).	This	is	a	pretty	demanding	task.		A	 third	 challenge	 questions	 whether	 exceptionalism	 can	 make	 good	 on	 its	promise	 to	 vindicate	 certain	 intuitive	 judgements	 about	 the	 permissibility	 of	killing	in	war,	when	applied	to	non-traditional	conflicts.	These	cases	may	reveal	a	lack	 of	 alignment	 between	 our	 judgements	 and	 the	 properties	 that	exceptionalists	invoke	to	explain	them.	More	specifically,	irregular	conflicts	may	provide	 cases	 in	 which	 (i)	 the	 intuitive	 judgements	 persist,	 but	 the	 putative	explanatory	 properties	 are	 absent,	 or	 (ii)	 the	 properties	 remain,	 but	 our	judgements	 of	 permissibility	 shift	 dramatically.	 Such	 counter-examples	 would	suggest	 that	 the	 exceptionalist	 has	 either	 failed	 to	 identify	 the	 relevant	properties	that	explain	the	judgements,	or	that	the	original	judgements	ought	to	be	jettisoned,	in	which	case	the	appeal	to	exceptionalism	lacks	motivation.	For	 example,	 contractualist	 exceptionalism	 is	 often	 invoked	 to	 support	 the	intuition	 that	 combatants	 are	 permitted	 to	 kill	 their	 armed	 opponents	 in	war,	independently	 of	 whether	 their	 wars	 are	 just	 or	 unjust.	 However,	 if	 this																																																									18	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 demarcation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 war,	 see	 David	 Luban,	 ‘War	Crimes:	 The	 Laws	 of	 Hell’	 in	 Larry	 May	 (ed),	War:	 Essays	 in	 Political	 Philosophy	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008),	266-288.		
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permission	is	grounded	in	a	contract	between	states,	then	presumably	it	will	not	apply	to	soldiers	who	fight	 in	unjust	wars	against	non-state	belligerents.	These	individuals	therefore	commit	serious	moral	wrongs	by	fighting.	But	I	doubt	that	defenders	of	the	equal	permission	think	that	its	scope	is	restricted	in	this	way.	If	so,	we	will	have	cases	 in	which	the	target	 judgement	persists	 in	the	absence	of	the	putative	explanatory	properties.	A	similar	problem	emerges	if	one	takes	the	prohibition	 on	 targeting	 non-combatants	 to	 be	 grounded	 in	 contractual	considerations,	even	if	the	class	of	contractors	is	somehow	broadened	to	include	non-state	parties.	For	it	is	unlikely	that	a	contract	prohibiting	these	tactics	would	satisfy	 the	 mutual	 advantage,	 fairness	 and	 actual	 acceptance	 conditions	 in	conflicts	 involving	 militarily	 weak	 sub-state	 actors,	 who	 may	 be	 significantly	disadvantaged	by	the	ban.19	If	we	think	that	the	prohibition	still	holds	strong	in	these	cases,	it	is	not	clear	that	contractualism	can	account	for	our	judgements.		Collectivist	 versions	 of	 exceptionalism	may	 also	 be	 susceptible	 to	 counter-examples.	 Again,	 one	 application	 of	 this	 view	 is	 that	 it	 helps	 support	 common	views	about	killing	in	war	that	are	difficult	to	subsume	within	ordinary	morality,	such	as	the	permission	to	fight	in	wars	that	lack	a	just	cause.	But,	as	David	Rodin	has	 pointed	 out,	 appealing	 to	 the	 moral	 significance	 of	 collective	 action	 risks	extending	the	scope	of	these	permissions	to	conflicts	in	which	they	intuitively	do	not	 apply,	 since	 "Football	 violence,	 warring	 criminal	 gangs,	 mafia	 vendettas,	family	 feuds,	and	most	 forms	of	ethnic	and	racially	motivated	violence	are	also	mediated	 through	 group	 relations."20	To	 avoid	 this	 implication,	 the	 relevant	collectivist	 properties	 need	 to	 be	 refined.	 One	 plausible	 response	 restricts	exceptional	 permissions	 to	 political	 belligerent	 collectives,	 defined	 as	 groups	"engaged	 in	 violence	 in	 support	 of	 political	 goals,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 aiming	 at	creating	(or	restoring)	a	new	collective	ordering"21.	This	certainly	excludes	many	groups,	 but	 it	 still	 seems	 controversially	 inclusive.	 For	 example,	 ISIS	 surely	counts	 as	 a	 political	 collective	 on	 this	 conception,	 but	 I	 think	 most	 just	 war	theorists	 would	 be	 reluctant	 to	 attribute	 any	 special	 permissions	 to	 ISIS	combatants,	 even	 if,	 counter-factually,	 they	 restricted	 their	 attacks	 to	 military	targets.22	However,	once	we	start	 tightening	up	 the	 collectivist	 conditions	even	further	it	is	hard	to	see	how	we	can	avoid	excluding	many	states	from	the	scope	of	 exceptionalist	 permissions.	 For	 example,	 one	 obvious	 way	 of	 excluding	organisations	like	ISIS	is	to	appeal	to	the	moral	undesirability	of	the	group’s	aim.	However,	 once	 we	 employ	 such	 a	 moralised	 conception	 of	 what	 counts	 as	 a																																																									19	Benbaji	comes	close	to	conceding	this,	but	attempts	to	show,	on	empirical	grounds,	that	weak	parties	 would	 consent	 to	 a	 revised	 version	 of	 the	 prohibition.	 Yitzhak	 Benbaji,	 'Justice	 in	Asymmetric	 Wars:	 A	 Contractarian	 Analysis',	 Law	and	Ethics	 of	Human	Rights	 6,	 No.2	 (2012),	172-200.	For	 further	discussion	of	 the	moral	 force	of	agreements	 in	 the	context	of	asymmetric	wars,	see	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	Ch.7.	20	David	Rodin,	‘The	Moral	Inequality	of	Combatants:	Why	jus	in	bello	Asymmetry	is	Half-Right’	in	Rodin	and	Shue	(eds),	Just	and	Unjust	Warriors,	44-68	at	p.65.	21	Kutz,	‘The	Difference	Uniforms	Make',	p.176.	22	On	this	point,	see	Robert	E.	Goodin,	What’s	Wrong	With	Terrorism?	(Malden,	MA:	Polity	Press,	2006),	Ch.1.	
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political	 collective,	 then	 it	 looks	 like	 states	 fighting	 unjust	 wars	 will	 also	 be	excluded.23	Non-traditional	conflicts	thus	provide	a	rich	source	of	tricky	cases	in	which	to	test	our	intuitions,	which	in	turn	impose	additional	constraints	on	the	task	of	demarcation	outlined	above.	Pragmatic	 humanitarianism	 may	 also	 have	 rather	 revisionary	 implications	when	extended	beyond	core	cases	of	interstate	conflict.	This	is	surprising,	since	the	view	is	typically	deployed	in	support	of	certain	legal	orthodoxies,	such	as	the	equal	 impunity	 granted	 to	 all	 combatants	 in	 war	 provided	 they	 attack	 only	military	targets.	The	claimed	justification	for	this	neutrality	is	that	it	incentivises	restraint,	 thereby	reducing	the	suffering	that	war	causes.	However,	consistency	would	 seem	 to	demand	 that	 the	 same	pragmatic	 rationale	 for	 determining	 the	
content	of	rules	for	conduct	in	war	should	also	determine	their	scope.	If	a	set	of	rules	 is	 justified	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 valuable	 outcomes	 their	 implementation	promotes,	then	we	should	recommend	their	application	to	any	conflict	in	which	doing	so	has	a	sufficiently	good	chance	of	achieving	this	result.	To	demonstrate,	consider	a	non-traditional	conflict	such	as	the	Mexican	drug	'wars',	which	cause	huge	 amounts	 of	 suffering,	 especially	 to	 civilians.	 Furthermore,	 imagine	 that	 it	were	possible	to	impose	a	neutral	system	of	rules	on	this	conflict,	which	granted	equal	impunity	to	state	soldiers	and	to	armed	cartel	members,	and	that	doing	so	would	 significantly	 reduce	 harm	 to	 civilians.	 Under	 these	 conditions,	 practical	humanitarianism	 should	 recommend	 doing	 so.24	If	 we	 find	 this	 intuitively	unacceptable,	 or	 at	 least	 troubling,	 this	 casts	 doubt	 on	 whether	 practical	humanitarianism	successfully	justifies	these	practices	in	the	standard,	interstate	cases.25		The	 challenges	 sketched	 above	 clearly	 do	 not	 suffice	 to	 settle	 the	reductivism/exceptionalism	 debate.	 As	 mentioned,	 much	 will	 depend	 on	 the	particular	brand	of	exceptionalism	and	the	specific	substantive	judgements	that	it	 is	 invoked	to	support.	But	 I	hope	to	have	shown	that	 thinking	about	cases	of	non-traditional	 conflict	 provides	 a	 useful	 standpoint	 from	 which	 to	 make	progress	on	this	issue.	
	
3.	Insurgencies,	Interstate	Wars,	and	Just	Cause	I	 now	 turn	 to	 the	moral	 justification	 of	 resorting	 to	 civil	war,	 focussing	 on	 an	important	sub-set	of	these	cases,	 in	which	members	of	a	sub-state	group	resort	to	 war	 against	 their	 own	 state.	 Term	 these	 insurgencies.	 This	 include	 cases	 of																																																									23	Rodin,	‘The	Moral	Inequality	of	Combatants’.	24	For	 an	 argument	 that	 elements	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 war	 should	 be	 extended	 to	 this	 conflict,	 see	Carina	 Bergal,	 'The	 Mexican	 Drug	 War:	 The	 Case	 for	 a	 Non-international	 Armed	 Conflict	Classification',	Fordham	International	Law	Journal	34	(2011),	1042-1088.	25	For	 a	more	 detailed	 version	 of	 this	 objection,	 see	Kutz,	 ‘The	Difference	Uniforms	Make'.	 For	further	discussion,	see	Finlay,	‘Legitimacy	and	Non-State	Political	Violence’.	David	Rodin	pursues	a	structurally	similar	line	of	objection	regarding	the	content	of	pragmatic	humanitarian	norms,	as	opposed	to	their	scope.	David	Rodin,	‘The	Morality	and	Law	of	War',	in	Huw	Strachan	and	Sibylle	Scheipers	 (eds),	The	Changing	Character	of	War	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2011),	 446-463.	
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revolution	 (in	which	 insurgents	 aim	 to	 replace	 the	 government	 of	 their	 state),	
secession	(in	which	insurgents	aim	to	annex	and	govern	a	portion	of	their	state’s	territory,	 leaving	 the	 state’s	 sovereignty	 over	 the	 remainder	 of	 its	 territory	unchallenged),	 and	 rebellion	 (in	 which	 insurgents	 aim	 to	 force	 specific	 policy	changes	 or	 concessions,	 without	 challenging	 the	 regime's	 general	 claim	 to	govern.)	Despite	 several	 prominent	 figures	 in	 the	 history	 of	 political	 philosophy	denying	 that	 violently	 opposing	 the	 state	 is	 ever	 permitted	 –	 Kant	 most	notoriously	–	few,	if	any,	contemporary	theorists	accept	this	extreme	view.	While	it	 is	 uncontroversial	 that	 insurgencies	 could	 be	 justified	 under	 certain	circumstances,	 the	specific	question	I	will	consider	 is	whether	 insurgencies	are	subject	to	a	different	justificatory	burden	at	the	bar	of	jus	ad	bellum,	compared	to	traditional	interstate	wars	of	national-defence.	There	are	several	fairly	obvious	respects	in	which	insurgents	may	be	morally	disadvantaged.	Firstly,	 sub-state	 actors	 typically	 lack	 the	military	 and	material	resources	 that	 states	 possess,	 and	 so	 may	 find	 it	 more	 difficult	 to	 satisfy	 the	requirement	 that	war	have	a	 reasonable	chance	of	 success.	However,	 the	mere	fact	 that	 insurgents	 cannot	 achieve	 their	 aims	 by	 conventional	military	means	does	not	 licence	 the	 conclusion	 that	 they	 fail	 the	 success	 condition,	 since	non-conventional	warfare	could	still	be	effective.	This	 reveals	 a	 second	 possible	 justificatory	 asymmetry,	 since	 non-conventional	 methods	 may	 be	 additionally	 morally	 objectionable,	 even	 if	effective.	 For	 example,	 in	 certain	 cases	 effectively	 waging	 an	 insurgency	 may	require	 intentionally	 targeting	non-combatants,	either	 to	weaken	the	enemy	or	to	coerce	support	for	the	insurgents.	26	Assuming	that	attacking	non-combatants	is	 particularly	 difficult	 to	 justify,	 wars	 that	 require	 such	 methods	 inherit	 this	additional	justificatory	burden.	Thirdly,	 insurgencies	 may	 be	 more	 difficult	 to	 justify	 in	 terms	 of	 the	requirement	 that	war	be	 the	 last	 resort,	 since	 sub-state	groups	may	be	able	 to	press	 their	 claims	 by	 legal	 means,	 or	 by	 non-violent	 resistance.27	This	 is	particularly	 likely	 to	 be	 true	 within	 broadly	 liberal-democratic	 societies.28	By	contrast,	these	options	may	not	be	available	for	states	facing	outside	aggression.	However,	 this	 cuts	 both	 ways,	 since	 sub-state	 groups	 often	 lack	 access	 to	international	arbitration	procedures	that	are	available	to	states.29		Fourthly,	 the	 fact	 that	sub-state	groups	generally	have	fewer	members	than	states	is	not	only	relevant	to	their	ability	to	satisfy	the	success	condition,	but	also	to	whether	insurgencies	fought	on	their	behalf	are	proportionate.	This	is	because																																																									26	For	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	 latter,	 see	 Buchanan,	 ‘The	 Ethics	 of	 Revolution	 and	 its	Implications	for	the	Ethics	of	Intervention’.	27	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.150.	28	Jeff	 McMahan	 criticises	 Palestinian	 terrorist	 attacks	 for	 this	 reason	 (among	 others).	 Jeff	McMahan,	‘Just	Cause	for	War’,	Ethics	and	International	Affairs	19,	No.3	(2005),	1-21	at	p.12.	29	On	 this	 point,	 see	 Anna	 Moltchanova,	 ‘Stateless	 National	 Groups,	 International	 Justice	 and	Asymmetric	Warfare’,	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	13,	No.2	(2005),	194-215.	
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the	amount	of	collateral	harm	that	it	is	permissible	to	cause	in	pursuit	of	a	war-aim	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	 number	 of	 individuals	 who	 will	 benefit	 from	 its	achievement.	 Holding	 the	 amount	 of	 collateral	 harm	 constant,	 the	 smaller	 the	group	contemplating	resorting	to	insurgency,	the	harder	it	will	be	to	satisfy	the	proportionality	criterion.30	However,	 while	 practically	 important,	 the	 foregoing	 asymmetries	 are	 of	limited	 philosophical	 interest,	 since	 they	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 simply	 tracking	contingent	 differences	 in	 the	 non-normative	 facts,	 rather	 than	 any	 deep	moral	distinction	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 conflict.	 By	 contrast,	 as	 Cecile	 Fabre	 has	emphasised,	 two	 factors	 are	 genuinely	 distinctive	 about	 insurgencies:	 They	involve	the	use	of	organised	violence	(i)	by	non-state	actors	(ii)	against	their	own	state	 and	 its	 officials.31	Our	 topic,	 then,	 is	 whether	 the	 political	 status	 of	 the	insurgents,	and	the	special	relationship	between	them	and	their	state,	can	ground	a	deeper	justificatory	asymmetry	between	insurgencies	and	interstate	conflicts.	I	return	to	political	status	in	the	next	section.	Here	I	discuss	the	moral	significance	of	insurgents’	relationship	to	their	state.	One	natural	way	of	appealing	to	the	special	relationship	between	insurgents	and	their	states	concerns	the	requirement	of	just	cause.	More	precisely,	it	may	be	argued	 that	 this	 relationship	 affects	 the	 threshold	 of	 severity	 at	 which	 rights	violations	 become	 candidates	 for	 remedy	 by	 military	 means.	 Perhaps	 the	relationship	 places	 an	 additional	 constraint	 on	 resorting	 to	 war	 against	 one’s	own	state,	 thereby	raising	the	threshold	of	 injustice	required	to	generate	a	 just	cause	 for	 insurgency,	 compared	 to	 a	 war	 against	 outside	 aggressors.32	On	 this	view,	there	is	a	restrictive	asymmetry	between	insurgencies	and	interstate	wars.		This	 line	of	argument	has	recently	been	 forcefully	opposed	by	Cecile	Fabre.	For	 Fabre,	 the	 fact	 that	 belligerents	 in	 civil	 wars	 stand	 in	 a	 state-subject	relationship	 is	 irrelevant	 to	whether	or	not	 the	 insurgents	possess	a	 just	cause	for	war,	and	so	“what	counts	as	a	just	cause	for	an	interstate	war	also	counts	as	a	just	 cause	 for	a	 civil	war,	 and	vice	versa.”33	Term	 this	 the	equivalence	thesis.	An	important	part	of	 assessing	 the	 comparative	permissibility	of	 insurgencies	will	thus	depend	on	the	truth	of	the	equivalence	thesis.	In	what	follows	I	set	out	three	possible	challenges.		
3.1	National	Partiality																																																									30	Some	have	found	it	unintuitive	that	whether	a	political	community	may	resort	to	war	depends	on	 the	 size	 of	 its	 population	 (for	 example,	 Seth	 Lazar,	 ‘National	Defence,	 Self-Defence,	 and	 the	Problem	of	Political	Aggression’,	 in	Cecile	Fabre	and	Seth	Lazar	 (eds),	The	Morality	of	Defensive	
War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	11-39	at	p.33).	However,	 it	seems	to	me	far	more	implausible	to	claim	that	the	numbers	don’t	matter.		31	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	Ch.4.	32	It	 is	worth	pointing	out	 that	potential	 just	 causes	 for	 insurgency	need	not	 involve	 the	 target	state	violating	the	rights	of	its	own	citizens.	Injustices	committed	by	a	state	against	non-members	could	also	generate	a	just	cause	for	insurgency,	even	if	it	is	internally	benevolent.		33	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.165.	
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The	 first,	which	 forms	Fabre's	main	 target	 in	defending	 the	equivalence	 thesis,	appeals	to	our	having	special	obligations	towards	co-nationals	in	order	to	justify	a	 restrictive	 asymmetry.	 On	 this	 view,	 considerations	 of	 partiality	 impose	 a	higher	 threshold	 of	 injustice	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 resorting	 to	 war	 against	 one’s	own	state,	compared	to	external	aggressors,	since	doing	so	requires	killing	and	injuring	one’s	co-nationals.		However,	the	normative	claim	underpinning	this	view	is	more	controversial	than	one	might	think.	Firstly,	one	cannot	simply	appeal	to	the	widely	shared	anti-cosmopolitan	 intuition	 that	 partiality	 to	 co-nationals	 is	permissible	 in	 order	 to	show	 that	 co-nationality	 makes	 insurgencies	 harder	 to	 justify.	 For	 this	 is	compatible	with	the	permissibility	of	weighing	the	interests	of	co-nationals	and	outsiders	 equally.	 Instead,	 it	 must	 be	 claimed,	 more	 strongly,	 that	 partiality	towards	 co-nationals	 is	 obligatory.	 Secondly,	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 these	obligations	are	able	to	do	the	moral	work	required.	For	example,	the	view	seems	to	imply	that	if	a	gang	of	thugs	threaten	to	inflict	a	certain	level	of	harm	on	me,	the	amount	of	harm	it	is	permissible	for	me	to	cause	in	self-defence	(either	to	the	attackers	or	 to	bystanders)	depends	on	whether	 I	 am	attacked	by	 co-nationals	within	 my	 home	 territory,	 or	 by	 foreigners	 while	 aboard.	 This	 seems	 highly	counter-intuitive.	Furthermore,	even	if	defensible,	the	normative	claim	may	not	in	fact	support	the	desired	conclusion.	For	when	a	community	has	 fissured	to	 the	point	where	civil	war	 is	 a	 genuine	 possibility,	 often	 along	 ethnic	 or	 cultural	 lines,	 it	 seems	doubtful	 that	 there	 exist	 particularly	 strong	 bonds	 of	 co-nationality	 between	members	 of	 the	 belligerent	 groups	 capable	 of	 grounding	 special	 obligations.	Hence,	it	is	unclear	that	the	distinction	between	those	to	whom	we	have	special	obligations	 and	 those	 to	 whom	 we	 do	 not	 will	 reliably	 track	 the	 distinction	between	those	we	must	kill	 in	order	to	wage	an	insurgency	and	those	we	must	kill	in	order	to	resist	external	aggression.	
	
3.2	The	Obligation	to	Obey	A	different	 argument	 in	defence	of	 a	 restrictive	asymmetry	 focuses	 on	 the	 fact	that	states	claim	a	right	to	rule,	correlated	with	an	obligation	to	obey	on	the	part	of	 their	 subjects.	 The	 central	 idea	 is	 that	 these	 political	 obligations	 impose	 an	additional	constraint	on	waging	war	against	one's	own	state.	Given	this,	a	greater	injustice	 is	 required	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 a	 just	 cause	 for	 insurgencies,	 since	these	obligations	must	be	overridden.	However,	 the	defender	of	 the	equivalence	 thesis	 is	unlikely	 to	be	moved	by	this.	Modern	 consensus	holds	 that	 states	have	 legitimate	 authority	 in	 virtue	 of	serving	or	benefitting	their	subjects	in	some	relevant	respect.	When	a	state	fails	to	carry	out	its	legitimating	functions,	it	forfeits	its	right	to	rule,	thus	relieving	its	subjects	 of	 any	 obligation	 to	 obey.	 If	 we	 understand	 a	 just	 cause	 for	 war	 as	consisting,	 roughly,	 in	 threatened	 rights	 violations	 of	 sufficient	 gravity	 to	warrant	remedy	by	large-scale	lethal	force,	then	it	seems	uncontroversial	that	if	
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a	state	is	committing	wrongs	of	this	magnitude	against	its	own	citizens,	 it	must	thereby	 have	 forfeited	 its	 authority.	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 a	 rights	 violation	 is	 of	sufficient	seriousness	to	warrant	remedy	by	means	of	war	when	imposed	by	an	external	aggressor,	then	it	is	also	of	sufficient	seriousness	to	void	a	state’s	right	to	rule.34	Hence,	political	obligations	cannot	constrain	just	causes	for	insurgency.	Interestingly,	 however,	 the	 conjunction	 of	 two	 common	 views	 regarding,	respectively,	 the	 limits	 of	 political	 authority	 and	 the	 permissibility	 of	 national	defence	casts	some	doubt	on	the	obviousness	of	this	claim.	Firstly,	it	is	generally	accepted	 that	 states	 don’t	 have	 to	 be	 maximally	 just	 or	 infallible	 in	 order	 to	successfully	 perform	 their	 legitimating	 functions.	 	 States	may	 retain	 a	 right	 to	rule	while	 still	 committing	 ‘tolerable'	 injustices.35	Secondly,	 common	 intuitions	about	permissible	national	defence	suggest	that	the	threshold	at	which	injustices	generate	a	just	cause	for	war	is	considerably	lower	than	that	of	serious	violations	of	 basic	 human	 rights,	 such	 as	 genocide	 and	 severe	 oppression.	 For	 example,	many	believe	 that	 it	 is	 permissible	 to	wage	war	 against	 ‘bloodless	 aggressors’,	who	 aim	 to	 violate	 only	 ‘lesser’	 rights,	 such	 as	 those	 to	 political	 self-determination,	territory,	property,	or	certain	social	and	political	goods.36		The	 equivalence	 view	 is	 most	 plausible	 if	 we	 set	 a	 high	 threshold	 for	 just	causes	for	war,	in	terms	of	grievous	breaches	of	human	rights.	It	is	very	doubtful	that	 a	 state	 could	 commit	 such	 wrongs	 against	 its	 citizens	 while	 retaining	 its	legitimacy.37	However,	 the	 lower	 we	 set	 the	 just	 cause	 threshold,	 in	 line	 with	common	 views	 about	 bloodless	 aggression,	 the	 weaker	 the	 equivalence	 thesis	becomes.	 For	 if	 wars	 are	 permissible	 in	 defence	 of	 comparatively	 minor	interests,	 then	 it	 is	 not	 obviously	 implausible	 that	 states	 could	 retain	 their	authority	while	committing	injustices	comparable	to	bloodless	aggression.	If	so,	political	 obligations	 could	 potentially	 constrain	 just	 causes,	 thus	 supporting	 a	restrictive	asymmetry	between	insurgencies	and	interstate	wars.	Of	course,	this	brief	argument	does	not	suffice	to	show	that	the	equivalence	thesis	 is	mistaken.	 It	remains	open	to	a	defender	of	the	thesis	to	argue	that	we	reject	 one	of	 the	 two	views	with	which	 is	 in	 tension.	Most	plausibly,	 they	may	argue	that	we	should	jettison	intuitions	about	permissible	national-defence	and	instead	 adopt	 a	 higher	 just	 cause	 threshold.	 In	 fact,	 one	may	 invoke	 intuitions	about	 the	 permissibility	 of	 insurgency	 directly	 in	 support	 of	 doing	 so.	 A	 quick	glance	 around	 the	 world	 reveals	 a	 fairly	 large	 number	 of	 non-state	 groups	suffering	what	may	be	called	‘bloodless	injustice’	at	the	hands	of	their	state,	such	as	a	frustration	of	rights	to	political	self-determination.	But	I	doubt	that	many	of																																																									34	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.137.		35	For	a	defence	of	the	claim	that	unjust	states	may	still	be	legitimate,	see	David	Copp,	'The	Idea	of	a	Legitimate	State',	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	28,	No.1	(1999),	3-45.	36	For	 extensive	 discussion	 of	 bloodless	 aggression,	 see	 the	 collection	 of	 essays	 in	 Fabre	 and	Lazar	(eds),	The	Morality	of	Defensive	War.	37	In	 defending	 the	 equivalence	 thesis,	 Fabre	 invokes	 precisely	 this	 type	 of	 violation.	 Similarly,	Buchanan	 discussion	 of	 permissible	 revolution	 is	 explicitly	 limited	 to	 those	 waged	 against	‘Resolute	Severe	Tyrannies’.	'The	Ethics	of	Revolution	and	its	Implications	for	Intervention'.	
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us	think	that	such	groups	have	a	straightforward	just	cause	for	lethal	resistance,	in	 the	 same	way	 that	we	 are	 inclined	 to	 in	 the	 case	 of	 states	 facing	 bloodless	aggression.38	Unless	 there	 is	 some	 principled	 explanation	 for	 the	 intuitive	asymmetry	 between	 killing	 in	 defence	 of	 rights	 to	 self-determination	 that	 are	currently	 enjoyed	 and	 killing	 in	 order	 to	 realise	 those	 rights	 when	 they	 are	wrongly	denied	(as	I	have	suggested	there	may	be),	consistency	requires	taking	either	a	considerably	more	permissive	view	of	insurgency,	or	a	more	restrictive	view	of	national	defence.	To	me,	the	latter	seems	the	more	palatable.39		
3.3	Fiduciary	Obligations	It	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 challenge	 the	 equivalence	 thesis	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	threshold	of	injustice	required	to	generate	a	just	cause	for	 insurgencies	may	be	
lower	 than	 that	 for	 interstate	 wars.	 In	 other	 words,	 there	 is	 a	 permissive	justificatory	 asymmetry	 between	 insurgencies	 and	 interstate	 wars.	 To	 my	knowledge,	 no	 one	 in	 the	 contemporary	 literature	 has	 explicitly	 advanced	 this	view.40	However,	 an	 argument	 for	 it	 can	 be	 constructed	 by	 combining	 two	arguments	 that	 have	 been	 advanced	 in	 other	 contexts,	 and	which	 are	 at	 least	
prima	facie	plausible.		The	first	argument	begins	with	the	idea	that	states	and	their	officials	stand	in	a	 fiduciary	 relationship	 to	 their	 subjects,	 having	 a	 special	 obligation	 to	protect	them	and	 to	act	 in	 their	 interests.41	These	obligations	obtain	regardless	of	how	well	 or	 poorly	 the	 state	 in	 fact	 serves	 its	 citizens,	 for	 it	 is	 not	 a	 condition	 of	having	certain	responsibilities	that	one	does	a	good	job	of	discharging	them.	In	virtue	of	these	obligations,	states	and	their	officials	can	wrong	their	subjects	in	a	distinctive	and	particularly	egregious	manner.42	For	example,	 John	Gardner	has	argued	 that	 a	 victim	 suffers	 a	 graver	 wrong	 if	 they	 are	 unjustly	 harmed	 by	 a	police	 officer,	 rather	 than	 an	 ordinary	 citizen,	 for	 the	 same	 reasons	 that	 one	would	be	 if	harmed	by	one's	parent	rather	 than	a	stranger.43	This	 thought	may																																																									38	As	Seth	Lazar	has	pointed	out	to	me,	 it	may	be	objected	that	this	 intuition	is	not	tracking	the	fact	that	these	groups	lack	a	just	cause,	but	the	fact	that	are	likely	to	fail	to	meet	some	other	ad	
bellum	requirement.	Admittedly,	it	is	hard	to	tell.	But	in	support	of	my	claim,	we	might	imagine	that	these	groups	have	a	magic	button,	which	if	pressed	will	result	in	their	instantly	having	a	fully	functioning	state	of	their	own,	but	will	cause	the	deaths	of,	say,	5000	soldiers	and	police	officers	of	the	(bloodlessly)	oppressive	regime,	as	well	as	1000	civilians.	 	Given	the	certainty	of	success	and	the	favourable	numbers,	 if	we	think	(as	I	am	inclined	to)	that	pushing	the	button	would	be	impermissible,	this	suggests	that	the	intuition	is	in	fact	tracking	the	just	cause	requirement.	39	For	a	more	detailed	version	of	this	argument	from	consistency,	see	Jeff	McMahan,	‘What	Rights	May	We	Defend	By	Means	of	War?’	in	Fabre	and	Lazar	(eds),	The	Morality	of	Defensive	War,	114-155	at	pp.133-135.			40	Though	Mattias	Iser	defends	several	of	the	elements	of	such	an	argument.	Iser,	‘Beyond	the	Paradigm	of	Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence’	41	See,	 for	 example,	 Evan	 Fox-Descent,	 ‘The	 Fiduciary	 Nature	 of	 State	 Authority’,	 Queens	 Law	
Journal	31	(2005),	259-310.		42	See,	Iser,	‘Beyond	the	Paradigm	of	Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence’	43	John	 Gardner,	 ‘Criminals	 in	 Uniform’,	 in	 Anthony	 Duff,	 Lindsey	 Farmer,	 Sandra	 Marshall,	Massimo	 Renzo	 and	 Victor	 Tadros	 (eds),	 The	 Constitution	 of	 Criminal	 Law	 (Oxford,	 Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	97-118.	
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gain	 further	 support	 from	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 distinctive	 wrongness	 of	 crimes	against	humanity	lies	in	the	fact	that,	in	these	cases,	the	institutions	of	the	state	are	 turned	 on	 those	 they	 are	 meant	 to	 protect.44	This	 argument,	 if	 successful,	establishes	 a	 moral	 asymmetry	 between	 unjust	 harms	 inflicted	 by	 one’s	 own	state	and	equivalent	harms	imposed	by	external	aggressors.		It	 does	not,	 however,	 suffice	 to	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	permissive	 asymmetry	between	 just	 causes	 for	 insurgencies	 and	 interstate	 wars.	 To	 do	 so,	 a	 second	argument	 must	 be	 invoked	 from	 the	 self-defence	 literature,	 concerning	 the	factors	that	determine	whether	defensive	harm	is	proportionate.	While	there	is	general	agreement	that	the	amount	of	defensive	harm	it	is	permissible	to	inflict	on	aggressors	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	amount	of	physical	harm	 their	 victim's	would	otherwise	suffer,	 several	 theorists	argue	 that	 the	degree	of	wrongfulness	 of	 the	harm	is	also	relevant.45	The	basic	thought	is	that	individuals	have	an	interest	not	simply	in	avoiding	harm,	but	also	in	avoiding	being	wronged	or	disrespected	by	others,	 which	 ought	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 content	 and	 limits	 of	 our	 defensive	rights.	Other	things	being	equal,	the	graver	the	violation	threatened,	the	greater	the	amount	of	harm	it	is	permissible	to	cause	to	prevent	it.	For	example,	victims	may	 inflict	more	harm	 in	defending	 themselves	against	 intentional	 rather	 than	merely	negligent	harm,	or	against	being	harmed	as	a	means	rather	than	as	a	side-effect.46		Taken	 together,	 these	 two	 arguments	 support	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	threshold	of	unjust	harm	required	to	generate	a	just	cause	for	insurgencies	may	be	lower	than	the	threshold	for	defence	against	external	aggression,	other	things	being	 equal.47	The	 existence	 of	 fiduciary	 obligations	 magnifies	 the	 wrong	individuals	 suffer	when	 they	are	harmed	by	 their	own	state,	 thereby	 justifying	defensive	 actions	 that	 would	 not	 be	 permissible	 in	 their	 absence.	 This	 is	 in	contrast	 to	 the	 equivalence	 view,	 which	 gives	 the	 impression	 that	 victims	 of	states	that	grossly	fail	to	perform	their	legitimating	functions	should	regard	their	assailants	as	morally	on-a-par	with	strangers.			
4.	Authority,	Consent	and	Popular	Support	
																																																								44	See,	 for	 example,	 Richard	 Vernon,	 ‘What	 is	 a	 Crime	 Against	 Humanity?’,	 Journal	 of	Political	Philosophy	10,	No.3	(2002),	231-249;	David	Luban,	‘A	Theory	of	Crimes	Against	Humanity’,	Yale	
Journal	of	International	Law	29	(2004),	85-163.		45	Jonathan	 Quong	 offers	 the	 most	 detailed	 argument	 for	 this	 position	 of	 which	 I	 am	 aware.	‘Proportionality	in	Defensive	Harm’	(unpublished	ms).	For	other	endorsements,	see	Iser,	‘Beyond	the	Paradigm	of	Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence’;	Yitzhak	Benbaji,	‘Culpable	Bystanders,	Innocent	Threats	and	the	Ethics	of	Self-Defense’,	Canadian	Journal	of	Philosophy	35,	No.4	(2005),	585-622;	Frances	Kamm,	 ‘Self-Defense,	Resistance,	 and	Suicide:	The	Taleban	Women’,	 in	Helen	Frowe	 and	 Gerald	 Lang	 (eds),	 How	We	Fight	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2014),	 75-86;	Frowe,	Defensive	Killing,	Ch.5.	46	Quong,	‘Proportionality	in	Defensive	Harm’.	47	One	possible	exception	being	cases	in	which	the	just	cause	for	insurgency	is	grounded	solely	in	the	target	state's	treatment	of	outsiders.	See	n.31	above.	
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As	we	saw	in	the	previous	section,	insurgents	may,	as	a	contingent	matter,	be	at	a	disadvantage	 in	 terms	of	 their	ability	 to	satisfy	 the	requirements	of	 last	 resort,	reasonable	 prospect	 of	 success,	 and	 proportionality.	 In	 addition,	 the	 special	relationship	between	insurgents	and	their	state	opponents	may	affect	whether	a	given	 injustice	 generates	 a	 just	 cause	 for	 war.	 But	 these	 do	 not	 exhaust	 the	standard	 requirements	 of	 jus	 ad	 bellum.	 Mainstream	 just	 war	 theory	 also	includes	 the	 criterion	 of	 'legitimate	 authority'.	 In	 the	 broadest	 terms,	 the	criterion	holds	that	in	order	to	be	justified,	wars	must	be	initiated	and	fought	by	a	certain	kind	of	belligerent	entity.	This	is	standardly	interpreted	to	mean	a	state,	a	coalition	of	states,	or,	more	permissively,	certain	non-state	entities	that	aspire	to	statehood.	While	comparatively	under-theorised	in	contemporary	debates,	the	authority	 criterion	 is	 clearly	 crucial	 to	 answering	 our	 next	 question:	 To	 what	extent	 does	 the	 political	 status	 of	 insurgent	 groups	 ground	 a	 justificatory	asymmetry	 between	 insurgencies	 and	 traditional	 interstate	 wars?	 For	 if	 the	standard	 interpretation	 of	 the	 criterion	 is	 correct,	 at	 least	 the	 majority	 of	insurgencies	will	be	automatically	unjustified.	However,	 for	 precisely	 this	 reason,	 many	 find	 the	 authority	 criterion	extremely	implausible.	Most	obviously,	it	seems	open	to	clear	counter-examples.	For	one,	 it	 implies	that	a	sub-state	group	facing	genocide	or	enslavement	could	not	permissibly	wage	war	against	their	oppressors,	even	if	they	satisfied	all	other	requirements	 for	 just	war.	This	 is	 very	hard	 to	believe.	More	 theoretically,	 the	criterion	is	also	deeply	at	odds	with	a	broadly	reductivist	approach,	according	to	which	the	initiation	and	waging	of	wars	can	be	justified	as	a	composition	of	acts	of	permissible	defensive	harming	between	individuals.	Since	it	is	not	a	necessary	condition	of	permissible	self-	or	other-defence	 that	one	have	a	certain	political	status,	 or	 be	 authorised	 by	 someone	 who	 does,	 the	 authority	 criterion	 seems	morally	redundant.	Two	 conclusions	may	be	 drawn	 from	 these	 objections.	 An	abolitionist	 view	holds	 that	 the	 authority	 requirement	 should	 be	 entirely	 jettisoned.48	If	 a	 war	satisfies	 the	remaining	ad	bellum	criteria,	 this	 is	sufficient	 for	 its	permissibility.	On	 this	view,	 the	political	 status	of	belligerents	 cannot	ground	any	deep	moral	asymmetry	 between	 insurgencies	 and	 interstate	wars.	 A	 reformist	view	 denies	the	sufficiency	claim.	Instead,	 it	aims	to	retain	the	criterion	in	a	more	plausible	form,	which	 both	 avoids	 absurd	 implications	 and	 is	 compatible	with	 justifying	war	in	terms	of	the	rights	and	interests	of	individuals.	One	 promising	 way	 of	 rehabilitating	 the	 criterion,	 suggested	 by	 several	writers,	is	to	replace	the	formal	property	of	statehood	with	the	normative	notion	of	 consent.49	The	 underlying	 claim	 is	 that	 it	 is	 an	 independent	 and	 necessary																																																									48	See,	 for	 example,	 Fabre,	 Cosmopolitan	War,	 Chs.3-4;	 Uwe	 Steinhoff,	 The	 Ethics	 of	 War	 and	
Terrorism	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	Ch.1.	49	Finlay,	 'Legitimacy	 and	 Non-State	 Political	 Violence’;	 Anne	 Schwenkenbecher,	 ‘Rethinking	Legitimate	 Authority’,	 in	 Fritz	 Allhoff,	 Nicholas	 G.	 Evans,	 and	Adam	Henschke	 (eds),	Routledge	
Handbook	 of	 Ethics	 and	 War	 (Abingdon:	 Routledge	 2013),	 161-170;	 Lionel	 McPherson,	 ‘Is	
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condition	of	permissible	defensive	force	that	the	beneficiaries	consent	to	it	or,	at	very	least,	do	not	overtly	refuse.	Term	this	the	consent	principle.50	On	this	view,	an	entity's	having	the	authority	to	wage	war	consists	 in	 its	being	authorised	to	do	 so	 by	 those	 on	whose	 behalf	 the	war	 is	 fought.	Without	 this	 authorisation,	waging	war	is	impermissible,	even	if	all	other	conditions	are	met.	Though	consent	is	intended	to	impose	an	independent	constraint	on	all	forms	of	armed	conflict,	it	is	particularly	salient	in	the	case	of	wars	fought	by	sub-state	belligerents,	 since	 these	 groups	 typically	 lack	 the	 institutional	 mechanisms	 to	demonstrate	that	they	have	popular	support,	and	are	often	criticised	for	claiming	to	 fight	 in	 the	 name	 of	 others	 without	 a	 sufficient	 mandate.	 So,	 while	 this	reformist	 view	does	not	 automatically	disqualify	 these	 groups	 from	having	 the	authority	to	wage	war	(thus	avoiding	the	counter-examples	mentioned	above),	it	may	 still	 provide	 support	 for	 the	 claim	 that	 insurgencies	 are	 harder	 to	 justify	than	wars	fought	by	functioning	states	(if	we	grant	the	empirical	assumption	that	sub-groups	are	 less	 likely	to	be	representative	of	those	they	fight	on	behalf	of).	The	 question,	 then,	 is	whether,	 and	 to	what	 extent,	 the	 consent	 principle	does	impose	a	genuine	constraint	on	war.			
4.1	Against	the	Consent	Requirement	The	 consent	 principle	 gains	 considerable	 support	 from	 our	 judgements	 about	simple	cases	of	other-defence.	Consider	the	following	example:		
Elevator:	Victor	is	taking	a	ride	in	an	elevator.	Agatha	hates	Victor	and	begins	to	saw	through	the	elevator	cable	in	order	to	kill	him.	Richie	is	walking	by	and	is	able	to	shoot	Agatha	with	his	sniper	rifle	before	she	succeeds	 in	 killing	 Victor.	 However,	 Victor	 is	 committed	 to	 non-violence	and	refuses	Richie’s	defensive	assistance.		In	 this	 case	 it	 does	 seem	wrong	 for	 Richie	 to	 kill	 Agatha	 in	 defence	 of	 Victor	(assuming	Victor	is	mentally	competent,	aware	of	the	facts,	etc.).	Victims	occupy	a	morally	privileged	position	within	the	morality	of	defence	-	it	is	their	interests	that	are	at	stake	after	all	-	and	this	gives	them	the	exclusive	right	to	decide	if	and	how	those	interests	are	defended.51	The	role	of	consent	thus	tracks	an	important	distinction	 between	 there	 merely	 being	 a	 potential	 justification	 for	 defensive	harm	and	a	particular	agent’s	actually	having	that	justification.	For	the	latter,	the	will	of	the	victim	must	be	engaged.	Rescuers	thus	wrong	the	victim	by	defending	
																																																																																																																																																														Terrorism	 Distinctively	 Wrong?’,	 Ethics	117,	 No.3	 (2007),	 524-546,	 Seth	 Lazar,	 'Authorisation	and	the	Morality	of	War'	(unpublished	ms).	50	Here	I	borrow	Allen	Buchanan’s	terminology.		‘The	Ethics	of	Revolution	and	its	Implications	for	the	Ethics	of	Intervention.’	51	For	more	detailed	discussion,	see	Cecile	Fabre,	‘Permissible	Rescue	Killings’,	Proceedings	of	the	
Aristotelian	Society,	 109	 (2009),	 149-164.	 See	 also,	 Finlay,	 'Legitimacy	 and	 Non-State	 Political	Violence’.	
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him	 against	 his	 express	 wishes,	 even	 if	 they	 do	 not	 wrong	 the	 attacker.	 More	specifically,	they	commit	the	distinctive	wrong	of	paternalism.52		Despite	 its	 appeal	 in	 these	 cases,	 an	 obvious	 difficulty	 with	 invoking	 the	consent	principle	as	a	constraint	on	war	is	that	groups	are	not	simply	individuals	writ	large.	There	is	no	straightforward	sense	in	which	a	victim	group	can	consent	to	or	refuse	 the	use	of	 force	on	 its	behalf	 in	 the	same	way	an	 individual	victim	can.	However,	an	obvious	solution	here	is	to	appeal	to	majority	consent	in	these	cases.	While	the	proportion	of	consent	required	is	unlikely	to	be	precise,	it	seems	plausible	that	if	a	clear	majority	of	the	members	of	a	victim	group	refuse	war	on	their	behalf,	then	defending	them	would	violate	the	consent	principle	and	so	be	impermissible.		The	 problem,	 however,	 is	 that	 intuitive	 judgements	 militate	 against	 the	straightforward	 move	 to	 a	 majoritarian	 version	 of	 the	 consent	 principle.	Consider	the	following	case53:		
Multiple	 Elevator:	 Victor	 and	 four	 others	 are	 taking	 a	 ride	 in	 an	elevator.	Agatha	begins	to	saw	through	the	elevator	cable	in	order	to	kill	 its	occupants	because	she	hates	them.	Richie	is	walking	by	and	is	able	to	shoot	Agatha	with	his	sniper	rifle	before	she	succeeds	in	killing	the	 five.	 Victor	 consents	 to	 Richie’s	 defensive	 assistance,	 but	 the	remaining	 four	 victims	 refuse	 due	 to	 their	 commitment	 to	 non-violence.		In	 this	 case,	 a	 clear	 majority	 of	 victims	 explicitly	 refuse	 defence,	 yet	 it	 seems	permissible	 for	 Richie	 to	 use	 defensive	 force	 nevertheless.	 The	 explanation	 of	why	defence	is	impermissible	in	the	original	Elevator	case	does	not	apply	here.	While	individuals	may	have	the	right	to	decide	whether	or	not	their	own	lives	are	defended,	this	does	not	extend	to	the	lives	of	others.	This	seems	true	even	if	the	victim	 group	 is	 not	 a	 pure	 aggregate	 of	 individuals,	 but	 is	 instead	made	 up	 of	individuals	 linked	 by	 morally	 significant	 ‘unifying	 relations’,	 such	 as	 shared	ethnicity,	 culture	 or	 conception	 of	 the	 good. 54 	As	 Andrew	 Altman	 and	Christopher	Heath	Wellman	put	it,	when	lives	are	at	stake,	“It	seems	dubious	to	hold	that	a	group	has	this	type	of	normative	dominion	over	its	members.”55	Given	 this	 result,	 some	 conclude	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	 a	 necessary	 condition	 of	permissible	war	that	the	majority	of	the	victim	group	consent	to	its	prosecution,	
																																																								52	On	a	fairly	standard	characterisation,	an	action	is	paternalist	if	it	involves:	(i)	interference	with	an	individual;	(ii)	against	their	will;	(iii)	for	the	sake	of	their	good.		53	Based	 on	 a	 case	 in	 Andrew	 Altman	 and	 Christopher	 Heath	 Wellman,	 ‘From	 Humanitarian	Intervention	 to	 Assassination:	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Political	 Violence’,	 Ethics	118,	 No.2	 (2008),	228-257	at	p.244.	54	I	borrow	this	phrase	from	McMahan,	‘Intervention	and	Collective	Self-Determination’.	55	Altman	and	Wellman,	‘From	Humanitarian	Intervention	to	Assassination’,	p.243.	
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or	 even	 that	many	 consent.56	In	 cases	 where:	 (i)	 consent	 is	 mixed	 among	 the	members	 of	 a	 victim	 group,	 and	 (ii)	 defending	 those	who	 do	 not	 consent	 is	 a	condition	of	defending	those	that	do,	a	 lack	of	consent	does	not	render	defence	impermissible.	 In	 other	words,	 provided	 that	 some	members	of	 a	 victim	group	consent	 to	 defence	 (or	 are	 not	 competent	 to	 refuse)	 the	 consent	 principle	 is	satisfied.57		Of	course,	this	is	not	to	deny	that	consent	may	play	an	important	indirect	role	in	 justifying	war.	 For	 example,	widespread	 refusal	may	provide	 good	 evidence	that	 a	 proposed	war	would	 not	 be	 justified,	 or	 render	 it	 unlikely	 to	 succeed.58		The	 claim	 is	 that	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 victims	 does	 not	 place	 an	 independent	constraint	 on	 defensive	 war,	 at	 least	 in	 any	 minimally	 realistic	 case.	 If	 this	sceptical	 view	 is	 correct,	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 insurgents	 are	 typically	 less	representative	 of	 those	 they	 fight	 on	 behalf	 of,	 compared	 to	 state	 belligerents,	would	not	provide	any	independent	support	for	the	claim	that	insurgencies	are	harder	to	justify.		
4.2	A	Qualified	Defence	of	Consent		I	believe	that	both	the	simple	majoritarian	view	and	the	strong	sceptical	view	are	mistaken.	 The	 correct	 account	 of	 the	 role	 of	 consent	 in	 justifying	 war	 lies	somewhere	 in	 the	 middle.	 While	 the	 sceptics	 are	 correct	 that	 majority	 or	widespread	consent	is	not	always	required	for	permissible	defence,	this	does	not	licence	the	stronger	conclusion	that	 it	 is	never	(or	rarely)	required.	 In	order	to	defend	a	more	robust	consent	requirement,	one	must	 identify	a	relevant	moral	difference	 between	 defensive	 wars	 and	 mixed-consent	 cases	 like	 Multiple	Elevator,	which	explains	why	broad	consent	may	be	required	in	the	former	but	not	the	latter.	Here	I	sketch	two	possible	responses	of	this	type.		
4.2.1	Individual	vs.	Collective	Rights	One	strategy	identifies	a	distinction	in	the	kinds	of	rights	that	are	at	stake	in	the	two	 types	 of	 case.	 It	 points	 out	 that	 just	 causes	 for	 war	 not	 only	 include	preventing	rights	violations	such	as	death,	enslavement,	and	other	atrocities,	but	also	 defending	 rights	 to	 political	 and	 social	 goods	 such	 as	 territory,	independence,	 and	 self-determination.59	The	 argument	 concedes	 that	 majority	consent	 is	not	a	requirement	 for	defending	the	former	class	of	rights	(as	 in	the	Multiple	 Elevator	 cases),	 but	 holds	 that	 it	 is	 required	 for	 defending	 the	 latter.	Since	wars	 and	 insurgencies	 are	often,	perhaps	 typically,	 justified	by	appeal	 to																																																									56	For	different	arguments	against	the	consent	principle,	see	Buchanan,	‘The	Ethics	of	Revolution	and	its	Implications	for	the	Ethics	of	Intervention.’	57	McMahan,	‘Humanitarian	Intervention,	Consent,	and	Proportionality’.	58	Altman	 and	 Wellman,	 ‘From	 Humanitarian	 Intervention	 to	 Assassination’.	 Interestingly,	however,	 there	 is	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 civilian	 support	 for	 insurgencies	 often	 depends	 on	military	success,	rather	than	vice	versa.	Kalyvas,	The	Logic	of	Violence	in	Civil	War,	Chs.	4-5.		59	Though	 this	 will	 depend	 on	 one's	 views	 about	 the	 bloodless	 aggression/injustice	 question	raised	in	the	previous	section.	
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political	 goods	 (national	 liberation	 struggles	 spring	 to	 mind	 most	 obviously),	majority	consent	is	therefore	usually	required.	But	why	 should	 this	difference	 in	 rights	 ground	a	difference	 in	 the	 consent	requirement?	One	answer	points	 to	a	difference	 in	 the	strength	of	 the	 interests	that	 the	 rights	 protect.	 	 While	 the	 value	 of	 majority	 rule	 may	 trump	 the	importance	of	protecting	less	weighty	political	rights,	when	it	comes	to	our	most	stringent	rights	(such	as	those	to	life	and	limb),	this	value	pales	in	comparison.60	However,	 this	doesn't	seem	to	be	the	right	answer.	Consider	a	variation	on	the	Multiple	Elevator	 case,	 in	which	Agatha	 threatens	 to	 inflict	 a	much	 less	 severe	harm	 on	 her	 five	 victims,	 a	 vicious	 pinch	 say,	 which	 Richie	 can	 avert	 by	defensively	pinching	Agatha.	If	 the	severity-based	explanation	were	correct,	we	would	expect	to	 judge	that	defending	the	victims	in	the	face	of	majority	refusal	would	 be	 wrong.	 Yet	 defence	 still	 seems	 permissible.	 As	 in	 the	 original	 case,	while	each	victim	has	 the	right	 to	decide	whether	 their	 interests	are	defended,	this	does	not	extend	to	the	interests	of	others.	A	more	promising	explanation	appeals	to	a	distinction	in	the	type	of	rights	at	stake,	rather	than	the	weight	of	the	interests	they	protect.	On	this	view,	majority	consent	 among	 the	 members	 of	 a	 victim	 group	 is	 required	 when	 the	 rights	violations	 threatened	 are	 collective	 rights,	 such	 as	 those	 to	 territory	 or	 self-determination,	 but	 not	 when	 the	 relevant	 rights	 are	 individual	rights,	 such	 as	those	to	life	and	limb.	A	full	account	of	collective	rights	is	far	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	But,	for	our	purposes,	we	need	only	highlight	one	important	feature	of	 collective	 rights,	which	 that	 is	 that	while	 such	rights	can	be	grounded	 in	 the	interests	 of	 individuals	 –	 namely,	 individuals’	 interests	 in	 enjoying	 certain	collective	or	communal	goods	–	they	can	only	be	exercised	collectively.61	No	one	member	can	unilaterally	exercise	a	collective	right	on	his	or	her	own,	including	authorising	third-parties	to	act	on	that	right.62	Rather,	some	collective	procedure	is	 required	 in	 order	 to	 successfully	 do	 so,	 majority	 decision-making	 being	 a	paradigmatic	example.		This	 feature	 of	 collective	 rights,	 it	may	 be	 argued,	 explains	why,	 in	 certain	cases,	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 members	 of	 a	 victim	 group	 is	 a	necessary	 condition	 for	 justifying	 defensive	war.	When	 a	 just	 cause	 for	war	 is	based	purely	on	individual	rights	(such	as	a	war	of	defence	against	mass	murder	or	enslavement),	each	individual	right-holder	has	the	moral	power	to	authorise	a	third-party	 to	 defend	 their	 rights,	 which	 is	 unaffected	 by	 the	 refusal	 of	 other	victims.	By	contrast,	if	the	just	cause	is	grounded	in	the	defence	of	interests	that																																																									60	Schwenkenbecher,	 ‘Rethinking	Legitimate	Authority’.	For	a	different	take	on	the	link	between	severity	and	consent,	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.155	61	On	this	point,	see	Allen	Buchanan,	Secession:	The	Morality	of	Political	Divorce	from	Fort	Sumter	
to	Lithuania	and	Quebec	(Boulder,	CO:	Westview	Press,	1991),	pp.74-75.	See	also,	Joseph	Raz,	The	
Morality	of	Freedom,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986),	p.208.	62	For	 a	 related	 discussion	 of	 authorisation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 defending	 jointly-held	 rights,	 see	Fabre,	 Cosmopolitan	War	 (esp.	 Ch.2)	 and	 Seth	 Lazar's	 review	 of	 the	 same	 in	 Ethics	124,	 No.2	(2014),	496-412.	
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are	protected	by	collective	rights,	that	right	can	only	be	permissibly	acted	upon	by	those	who	have	been	collectively	authorised	to	do	so.	So,	while	it	is	false	that	majority	 consent	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 all	 wars,	 it	 may	 be	 true	 for	 a	(possibly	large)	subset.		It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	one	could	resist	this	conclusion	by	adopting	a	high	 threshold	view	of	 just	 cause,	as	discussed	 in	 the	previous	section.	For	 if	the	kind	of	 interests	protected	by	collective	rights	are	not	 important	enough	to	justify	 large-scale	 killing,	 then	 having	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 collective	rights	violations	is	practically	irrelevant	for	justifying	war	in	their	defence.			
4.2.2	Consent	and	Proportionality	
	A	 different	 strategy	 aims	 to	 show	 that	 widespread	 consent	 among	 the	 victim	group	may	be	required	even	when	the	rights	threatened	are	purely	individual.	It	locates	 the	 relevant	difference	between	defensive	wars	 and	 cases	 like	Multiple	Elevator	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 former	 typically	 involves	 collaterally	 killing	innocents,	which	must	 be	 justified	 as	 a	matter	 of	 proportionality.	 On	 the	 view	under	 consideration,	 the	 consent	 of	 the	 victims	 plays	 two	 distinct	 roles	 in	establishing	 whether	 defending	 them	 is	 proportionate,	 by	 determining	 (i)	whether	certain	good	effects	are	admissible	in	the	proportionality	calculation	and	(ii)	whether	certain	bad	effects	are	discounted.	The	argument	for	the	first	claim	rests	on	a	particular	view	of	the	normative	effect	 that	 follows	 from	 a	 victim	 refusing	 defensive	 assistance.	 	 The	 basic	thought,	familiar	from	discussions	of	paternalism,	is	that,	by	refusing,	the	victim	removes	 their	 interests	 from	 the	 ‘pot’	 of	 values	 that	 may	 be	 appealed	 to	 in	justifying	 defensive	 harm.	 One	way	 of	 capturing	 this	 idea	 is	 by	 thinking	 of	 an	individual’s	refusal	as	morally	equivalent	to	their	non-existence,	for	the	purposes	of	 justifying	 harm.	 Hence,	 in	 justifying	 defence	 rescuers	 may	 only	 invoke	 the	interests	of	those	victims	that	have	not	been	rendered	ineligible	by	their	refusal.		This	view	accounts	for	why	majority	consent	is	intuitively	not	required	in	the	Multiple	 Elevator	 case.	 Though	 each	 of	 the	 four	 non-consenters	 successfully	withdraw	 their	 interests	 from	 the	 pot	 of	 eligible	 values,	 this	 does	 not	 render	defence	impermissible	because	the	interests	of	the	single	consenter	are	sufficient	to	 justify	 the	 total	amount	of	defensive	harm.	 	Were	 the	non-consenters	not	 to	exist,	 it	would	 still	 be	 permissible	 to	 kill	 Agatha	 in	 defence	 of	 Victor.	 It	 is	 this	particular	 feature	of	 the	case	 that	explains	why	the	number	of	refusing	victims	seems	 morally	 irrelevant.	 But,	 crucially,	 this	 feature	 is	 absent	 in	 cases	 where	defending	members	of	a	victim	group	also	requires	collaterally	killing	 innocent	persons,	 such	 as	 defensive	 wars.	 To	 demonstrate,	 consider	 a	 variation	 on	 the	Multiple	Elevator	case:		
Collateral	 Elevator:	 Victor	 and	 four	 others	 are	 taking	 a	 ride	 in	 an	elevator.	Agatha	begins	to	saw	through	the	elevator	cable	in	order	to	kill	 its	occupants	because	she	hates	them.	Richie	is	walking	by	and	is	
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able	to	blow	up	Agatha	with	his	grenade	before	she	succeeds	in	killing	the	 five.	However,	 doing	 so	will	 also	 kill	 an	 innocent	 bystander	 as	 a	side	 effect.	 Victor	 consents	 to	 Richie’s	 defensive	 assistance,	 but	 the	remaining	 four	 victims	 refuse	 due	 to	 their	 commitment	 to	 non-violence.		In	 this	 case,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 single	 consenter	 are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 justify	defence.	 Were	 the	 four	 non-consenters	 not	 to	 exist,	 Richie	 would	 not	 be	permitted	 to	 defend	 Victor,	 because	 collaterally	 killing	 one	 innocent	 person	would	be	disproportionate.	In	fact,	the	absence	of	just	one	of	the	victims	could	be	enough	 to	 render	 defence	 disproportionate,	 depending	 on	where	 one	 sets	 the	relevant	threshold.		If	we	accept	the	idea	that	individuals	have	this	kind	of	normative	control	over	their	 good,	 the	 refusal	 of	 members	 of	 the	 victim	 group	 may	 be	 much	 more	relevant	 to	 the	 permissibility	 of	 defensive	 force	 than	 the	 sceptic	 alleges.	 By	refusing,	victims	diminish	the	amount	of	value	that	may	be	invoked	in	order	to	justify	 collateral	 harm.	 Since	 wars	 usually	 involve	 considerable	 amounts	 of	collateral	 harm,	 widespread	 refusal	 by	 the	 intended	 beneficiaries	 of	 that	 war	may	significantly	count	against	it	being	proportionate.		Whereas	the	first	argument	for	the	dependence	of	proportionality	on	consent	focuses	on	victims	qua	beneficiaries,	the	second	focuses	on	victims	qua	objects	of	collateral	harm.	For	it	will	often	be	the	case	that	defending	a	group	of	victims	by	means	 of	 war	 will	 risk	 significant	 collateral	 harm	 to	 members	 of	 that	 group	(perhaps	especially	so	in	the	case	of	insurgencies,	which	are	often	fought	in	close	proximity	 to	 their	 putative	 beneficiaries).	 The	 argument	 rest	 on	 the	 plausible	idea	that	the	amount	of	harm	it	is	permissible	to	impose	in	order	bring	about	a	good	 effect	 is	 sensitive	 to	 whether	 those	who	will	 be	 harmed	 (as	 opposed	 to	benefitted)	consent	to	its	imposition.	For	example,	consider	the	standard	Trolley	Case,	 in	 which	 one	 person	 is	 collaterally	 killed	 in	 order	 to	 save	 five.	 Let’s	stipulate	 that	 five	 lives	 is	 the	 precise	 threshold	 at	 which	 killing	 one	 is	permissible.	Now	imagine	a	variation	in	which	there	are	only	four	victims	on	the	main	track,	but	the	single	person	on	the	side-track	freely	consents	to	being	killed	for	 the	greater	good.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	victim’s	 consent	 intuitively	makes	all	 the	difference,	rendering	permissible	an	otherwise	disproportionate	act	of	collateral	killing.		Generalising	 somewhat	 (and	 ignoring	 some	 important	 complications),	 this	result	suggests	that	defensive	actions	that	would	otherwise	be	disproportionate	in	 virtue	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	 imposed	 on	members	 of	 the	 victim	 group	 can	 be	rendered	 permissible	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 consent	 of	 a	 sufficient	 number	 of	 those	victims.	This	is	because	consent	can	permit	discounting	certain	bad	effects	in	the	proportionality	calculus.	As	with	the	argument	from	collective	rights,	these	two	proportionality-based	arguments	 do	 not	 show	 that	 widespread	 consent	 within	 a	 victim	 group	 is	
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necessary	in	order	to	justify	all	defensive	wars.	But,	taken	together,	they	provide	firm	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 insurgents	 may	 be	 at	 a	 moral	 disadvantage	compared	to	state	actors	(on	the	empirical	assumption	that	insurgent	groups	are	generally	less	likely	to	be	representative	of	those	on	whose	behalf	they	claim	to	fight.)63	
	
5.	Conclusion	According	 to	 perhaps	 the	 most	 popular	 method	 for	 doing	 moral	 and	 political	philosophy,	 one	 systematically	 compares	 one's	 judgements	 about	 particular	cases	and	about	general	principles,	and	then	goes	through	a	process	of	revising	these	 judgements	 where	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 them	 into	 a	 state	 of	coherence	 and	 mutual	 support.	 If	 there	 is	 a	 general	 lesson	 to	 be	 learnt	 from	issues	 I	 have	 sketched	 in	 this	 chapter,	 it	 is	 that	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 task	 of	uncovering	the	morality	of	war,	we	will	need	to	include	our	judgements	about	a	much	 wider	 range	 of	 cases	 as	 inputs	 into	 this	 reflective	 process.	 These	 may	require	some	interesting	revisions	in	order	to	be	accommodated.		
																																																								63	For	different	arguments	 in	 support	of	 a	 similar	 conclusion,	 see	Lazar,	 'Authorisation	and	 the	Morality	of	War'.	
